Wide and narrow productivity: the two divides that will shape the post-work economy

In this piece, I explore the diverging paths of human labor as AI reshapes the global economy. I reveal how Wide Productivity amplifies individual effort through technology, capital, and discipline, producing immense surplus enjoyed by millions. At the same time, I acknowledge the rise of Narrow Productivity, where displaced workers rely on self-sufficiency and localized output, often lacking access to the luxuries of scale. I wrestle with the looming societal tensions between these two worlds, where moral systems of contribution and need must coexist. The stability of nations, I conclude, will depend on managing this growing divide.


As AI accelerates its takeover of traditional labor functions, we are not simply entering a world of “job loss” or “technological disruption.” We are entering a world where the very purpose of work — and its role in human life — fractures into two distinct economic realities.

We can call these two realities Wide Productivity and Narrow Productivity.

Wide Productivity is the world I live in today. It is the world many of us still occupy — the economy of compounded effort. Human work here is not self-contained; it is multiplied. A single worker’s expertise may be multiplied through capital, infrastructure, software, and now AI agents, producing massive outputs that serve millions. This is the productivity of enterprise:

  • The engineer whose code is deployed across global platforms.
  • The designer whose work scales across product lines.
  • The CEO whose leadership coordinates hundreds or thousands of agents — human and machine — producing value far beyond any one individual’s manual contribution.

The incentives that drive Wide Productivity are enormous — not only financially, but in terms of mastery, achievement, and impact. It requires education, discipline, years of refinement. And it produces the very surplus that allows for the lifestyles, luxuries, and comforts that define modern life: smartphones, air travel, pharmaceuticals, electric vehicles, global logistics, instant entertainment. The fruits of Wide Productivity are highly leveraged and widely consumed.

Narrow Productivity will emerge as its counterpart.

Narrow Productivity is highly localized. The individual grows food in a personal garden. Repairs their own tools. Builds and barters within small circles. Produces enough for themselves or for a few others. It is productivity in the most literal sense — effort translated into survival or modest improvement for the producer alone.

This form of productivity has always existed — but in the modern world, it has been peripheral. Soon, for many, it may become primary. The reason is brutal, but simple: as AI displaces enormous swaths of middle-skill labor, millions will find themselves structurally excluded from Wide Productivity. Not because they lack value as human beings, but because they lack the highly leveraged, highly specialized capabilities that the compounding systems now require.

And we must be honest: many of these individuals never loved work to begin with. They worked because they had to. They resented the necessity, questioned the system, or simply struggled to connect meaningfully to their labor. The idea that work must be central to existence was always more tolerable to those of us — like myself — who derive meaning from toil. My life is built around two pillars: prayer and toil. That is my form of awakening. I rise each day, not to be entertained, but to build.

But not all feel this way. And their time is coming.

The world will not stop producing — but who participates in that production will shrink. The productive surplus of Wide Productivity will continue, but in the hands of increasingly small cohorts with extraordinary leverage. And this creates a dangerous transitional problem:

  • Those left in Narrow Productivity will still desire the fruits of Wide Productivity.
  • But their own narrow outputs — a home garden, a personal craft, local services — will not generate the currency necessary to acquire those goods.

In a stable, idealized system, perhaps narrow producers would also become narrow consumers — living on what they produce, trading among small communities. But this is unlikely. We live in a world conditioned to consume the products of mass scale: iPhones, new-model cars, global entertainment, pharmaceuticals, industrial medical care, and more. These cannot be replaced by local barter systems or subsistence labor.

The question, then, is how these two economies — Wide and Narrow Productivity — will coexist. The answer is not yet clear, but several realities are almost certain:

  • Wide Productivity will continue to demand hierarchy, skill, and discipline. The people operating these systems will be few in number but highly capable.
  • Narrow Productivity will require new forms of societal support. Whether through universal income, subsidized services, or redistribution mechanisms, these individuals will need access to the output of Wide Productivity without directly contributing to its engine.
  • Tensions will rise between the classes. Resentment from the supported class toward the productive class is likely — especially as wealth concentrates further in those who operate Wide Productivity systems.
  • The incentive structure must remain intact. Without reward for mastery, investment, and discipline, Wide Productivity collapses — and with it, the entire surplus that sustains both classes.

In the end, we are heading toward a world where two moral systems will run in parallel:

  • In Wide Productivity: “To each according to their contribution.”
  • In Narrow Productivity: “To each according to their need.”

Both will be necessary. Both will be real. And navigating the moral, economic, and political tensions between these two spheres will define the stability of nations for the next century.